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Abstract. The essay attempts to give an overview on the cases relating to Hungary before 
European Court of Justice in the period between 2004–2007, which are classified into four 
categories. The first part of the article analyses eleven procedures concerning petitions for 
preliminary rulings, illustrating the bearings of the cases and pointing out the importance as 
well as consequences from the point of view of the Hungarian legal order. The essay refers 
to the fact that activity of Hungarian courts to apply preliminary ruling procedures is 
exceptionally high comparing with the other nine Member States acceded to EU in 2004 and in 
almost each cases concerned, the references were profoundly considered by the Hungarian 
court. The second category described in this paper includes cases, in which Hungarian 
individual persons participate as litigants (including the cases before Civil Service Tribunal). 
The experiences of these procedures on the basis of direct complaints indicate the conclusion 
that in several cases, the attorneys representing the plaintiff before ECJ involve not enough 
responsibilities to avoid bringing obviously inadmissible actions. In the third part of the paper 
the reader can get an insight into the cases in which the Republic of Hungary appears as 
litigant. Finally the fourth category embraces cases with indirect interest relating Hungary. 
These are referred but not deeply examined in the article.  
 
Keywords: European Union, European law, EC law, European Court of Justice, Hungarian 
law, case law  
 
 
I. Introductory remarks 
 
With the accession of Hungary to the European Union, besides law-makers and 
law-applying organs, Hungarian law-seeker citizens and undertakings must 
take into consideration that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) bestowed with 
peremptory legal authority is entitled to make ultimate decisions on the 
interpretation and effect of EU Law. Thence, the updated monitoring of the 
judicial practice of the Luxembourg Court becomes indispensable and we need 
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to expend more substantial care in cases, in which Hungarian parties are 
directly concerned.  
 It can be quoted cases with Hungarian implications in the period before 
our accession, as well. One of the most familiar ones was the Balog Case (C-
264/98)1 also referred abroad. It was initiated by Tibor Balog, a former football 
player of MTK (a Hungarian League) by reason of the obligation illegally 
imposed on him to pay fees related to his registration to a European club.  
 Subsequently to our accession to the EU, the cases concerning Hungary 
before the ECJ will be classified into four categories. In petitions for pre-
liminary ruling, interested parties are established in the main proceedings 
conducted by Hungarian judicial organs. The second category as follows includes 
cases, in which Hungarian individual persons participate as litigants, whereas, 
in the third category, the Republic of Hungary appears as litigant: either as 
plaintiff or defendant. Finally, the fourth category consists of cases, in which 
on the basis of indirect interest, the Hungarian party appears in various statuses 
in the proceedings, e.g., as an intervener or submitting observation.2  
 
 
II. Petitions for preliminary ruling referred by Hungarian courts 
  
a) The role of the preliminary ruling procedure 
 
References for preliminary ruling under article 234 TEC guarantee the uniform 
application and interpretation of Community Law within the EU. If the court 
of a Member State applies Community Law during its proceedings, it may refer 
the case for preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice. It may request 
  
 1 The documents related to the specific cases can be searched on the basis of case 
numbers and downloaded from the homepage of the European Court of Justice, see: 
www.curia.eu. After having had terminated the proceeding in the referred Balog Case, it 
has been cancelled in the register of ECJ, thus, the relevant facts can be found only in the 
print edition of the European Court Reports (ECR).  
 2 This last category of cases include proceedings between other parties concerned, in 
which the Hungarian Government participates as an intervener or has the right to submit 
observation. These cases will not be analysed in this essay, but with respect to the practice 
so far, it can be  mentioned some example. The Hungarian Government participated as an 
intervener e.g. in the Case Commission v. Republic of France (C-304/02), and submitted 
observation in Tokaji I. Case (C-347/03), Suzuki Case (joined with C-23/02, C-24/02, C-
25/02), Bondi Case (C-341/04), Mostaza Case (C-168/05), Banca Popolare di Cremona 
Case (C-475/03), Vorel Case (C-437/05), Wienand Meilicke Case (C-292/04), RUMA 
GmbH Case (C-183/06) etc. 
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the interpretation of the acts of Community organs and the establishment of the 
validity of the latter ones. In some cases, the proceeding court is obligated to 
have recourse to the ECJ. Whereas, the European Court of Justice can neither 
make decisions on the merits of the case, nor can it annul national legal norms.  
 Comparing with the other courts of new Member States acceding to EU in 
2004, the Hungarian courts are relatively active to refer cases for preliminary 
ruling to ECJ. For the time being, eleven petitions have been referred to the 
ECJ from Hungarian judicial organs, out of which preliminary ruling has been 
accomplished in eight cases. Among that, there are cases referred in criminal 
procedures, but the ‘hits’ of the cases have concerned taxation issues.  
 
b) The ‘fallen’ of the red star: Fiasco in the first Hungarian case before ECJ 
 
Following the accession of Hungary to the EU, the first concluded proceedings 
were the Vajnai Case (C-328/04)3 referred by the Fővárosi Bíróság (Metro-
politan Court). The Metropolitan Court initiated criminal proceedings against 
Mr Attila Vajnai, deputy secretary-general of the Hungarian Communist Workers’ 
Party, on grounds of the charge of the use of totalitarian symbols. That is to 
say, because according to the Article 269/B. of Hungarian Criminal Code, the 
person who uses a symbol representing the red star (or other totalitarian 
symbol4) in public or publicly exhibits it commits a minor offence. The order 
for reference states that criminal proceedings were brought against Mr Vajnai 
for displaying on his clothing in public a five-point red star, made of cardboard 
with a diameter of 5 cm, during a demonstration held in Budapest. A police 
officer who was on duty requested him to remove that symbol, which he agreed 
to do. By judgment the Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Central District Court, 
Pest) found Mr Vajnai guilty of having used a ‘totalitarian symbol’ in violation 
of Hungarian Criminal Code. The court decided to impose a one-year suspended 
sentence and ordered confiscation of the symbol. Hereupon, Mr Vajnai appealed 
against that judgment to the court which has made the reference for a 
preliminary ruling. 
 The referring court, Fővárosi Bíróság, addressed the question to the Luxem-
bourg Court, whether the Criminal Code collides with the provisions of 
Community Law pertaining to discrimination or with other provisions. In the 
  
 3 The case was commented by Osztovics A.: Az első magyar előzetes döntéshozatali 
eljárás [The first Hungarian preliminary ruling case]. Európai jog, 4/5 (2004) 16–21.  
 4 Beside the red star, the swastika, the insignia of the SS, the arrow cross, the hammer 
and sickle, the five-point red star or any other symbol representing one of those signs fall 
within this article of Hungarian Criminal Code. 
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reference was cited Article 6 TEU,5 Council Directive 2000/43/EC,6 and 
Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,7 as well. The 
court has observed that in several Member States, such as the Italian Republic, 
the symbol of left-wing parties is the red star or the hammer and sickle. It 
follows that members of Italian left-wing organisations may wear symbols of 
the labour movement without contravening any prohibition, whereas the 
Hungarian Criminal Code prohibits the use of those symbols. Therefore, the 
question arises whether a provision in one Member State prohibiting the use of 
symbols of the international labour movement on pain of criminal prosecution, 
whereas the display of those symbols on the territory of another Member State 
does not give rise to any sanction, is discriminatory.  
 The Advocate General did not submitted written opinion in the case, then, 
the ECJ terminated its proceedings with reference to an obvious lack of its 
jurisdiction on 6th October, 2005. According to the brief reasoning of the order, 
the questions raised in the main proceedings cannot be interpolated into the 
frames of EC Law and the elaboration of criminal regulations is basically 
subject to the separate authorities of the Member States.8  
 Albeit the order has not mentioned because of needlessness of substantial 
analyse in the case, but it may be emphasized that the referring Hungarian 
court was at fault not only in the question of ECJ’s competence. Namely, the 
reference was partly based on such of legal ground which is obviously 
incorrect and irrelevant. The judge has cited some articles of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of European Union. But the Charter had no binding force 
yet and regarding its not compulsory character it does not belong to the acts of 
the EC Law.  
 
 
 
  
 5 Article 6 TEU para 1: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States.” 
 6 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. OJ L 180, 19.7. 2000. 
22–26.  
 7 The articles of the Charter mentioned in the reference concern freedom of thought, 
the freedom of opinion, the freedom of speech, and right of public meeting, right of 
combination and assembly, as well.  
 8 The ECJ referred directly to the doctrine laid down in the Kremzow Case. See Case 
C-299/95 Kremzow ECR [1997] I-2629, paragraph 15. 
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c) Reviewing the consumer protection regulation: the Hungarian Civil Code 
 before ECJ 
 
In the Ynos Case (C-302/04, Ynos Kft. v. János Varga), the facts were 
constituted by an action taken in connection with a contract of sale of real 
estate at the Szombathelyi Városi Bíróság (Municipal Court Szombathely). In 
his petition to the ECJ, the Hungarian judge requested the interpretation of 
some of the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Agreement 
Conditions. The two related questions exposed the issue, whether a rule of a 
member state conforms to the respective directive, according to which an 
unfair agreement condition can only be considered invalid, if the consumer 
expressly challenged it, and according to which other parts of the agreement 
can only persist as valid, if it had been concluded by the parties even without 
the condition that has proved to be unfair. Nevertheless, the third question was 
by far more important: does the element that the facts of the case of the main 
proceedings had been established before the accession of Hungary to the EU, 
i.e., before 1st May, 2004 influence the judgement of the former questions. The 
importance of the questions to be answered was indicated by the fact that the 
case was remitted to the Grand Chamber and that besides the Hungarian 
Government, the Commission and five other member states also made observa-
tions during the proceedings. Related to the third question, the Advocate 
General in his motion made on 22nd September, 2005 referred to the fact that 
since Hungary had not been a member of the EU at the time of the main pro-
ceedings, i.e., in 2002, the rules of the respective directive were not relevant, 
consequently, the European Court of Justice did not have competence to answer 
the questions. In case, nevertheless, the Court did establish its competence and 
considered the case on the merits, the Advocate General briefly dealt with the 
first two questions and according to his standpoint, the quoted regulations of 
the member state would be contrary to the directive.  
 In its Judgement of 10th January, 2006, the ECJ explicated that it was 
incompetent to examine the questions on their merits, since it had jurisdiction 
exclusively in those cases, the underlying facts of the cases of which were 
established following taking effect of the Accession Treaty.9 This doctrine had 
been consequentially adhered to by the ECJ related to former enlargements.10 
  
 9 Cf.  C-321/97. Andersson and Wåkerås-Andersson,  ECR [1999] I-3551, paragraph 31.  
 10 For further comments, see Láncos, P. L.: Case note: Ynos–intertemporality and the 
jurisdictional jurisprudence of the ECJ. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48/1 (2007) 87–93, 
Szabó P.: Az Ynos Kft.-ügyben hozott luxemburgi bírósági ítélet előzményei és utóélete – az 
előterjesztő magyar bíró szemével [The antecedents and the consequences of the judge-
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d) Importing cars from the inner European market: the successful attack on 
 the registration tax 
 
The registration tax regulation on import cars introduced after the Hungarian 
accession to EU was much discussed not only in the theory: several business 
federations, chambers etc. have heavily criticised the obviously discriminatory 
character of this Hungarian tax regulation. Two preliminary ruling procedures 
concerned this matter, which were finally joined and the ECJ passed common 
judgement in these cases.  
 Firstly, the Nádasdy Case was referred to ECJ, (C-290/05, Ákos Nádasdy v. 
Vám és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága). After the 
suspension of a procedure concerning the judicial review of an administrative 
decision, the Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Bíróság (County Court Hajdú-Bihar) had 
recourse to the ECJ. The plea in law exposed the issue, whether the domestic 
regulation of registration tax was in accordance with EC Law. Namely, whether 
a kind of tax imposed on motor vehicles imported from other member states is 
applicable, when it ignores the value of the car and determines the amount of 
the tax to be paid exclusively on the basis of the technical features of the motor 
vehicle (engine type, engine capacity) and of its environmental classification. 
On the other hand, how can the circumstance in re EC Law be evaluated, that 
no registration tax is imposed on motor vehicles placed in circulation before 
taking effect of the act on registration tax in Hungary. During the proceedings, 
the Hungarian and Polish Governments as well as the Commission submitted 
observation. According to the former ones, the regulation was in accordance 
with Community Law and the ECJ should reject the petition, since it could not 
reply, so as to promote the conclusion of the main proceedings. Nevertheless, 
the Commission deemed the Hungarian system of registration taxes discri-
minative and contrary to Community Law, which was not accidental, since it 
had conducted a related examination vis-à-vis Hungary in so-called breach of 
obligation proceedings. The Advocate General brought forward his motion on 
13th July, 2006. According to his standpoint, the system of registration taxes 
discriminated against cars imported from other Member States vis-à-vis used 
cars purchased in Hungary, since no registration tax had to be paid in case of 
                                                      
ment of Luxembourg Court in case Ynos Kft.–from the aspect of the referring judge]. 
Európai jog, 4/5 (2006) 31–36, Kovács, B.–Nemessányi, Z.: Az első magyar előzetes 
döntéshozatali eljárás margójára: a közösségi jog visszaható hatályának és a Dzodzi-elv 
alkalmazhatóságának kérdése [To the margin of the first Hungarian preliminary ruling 
case: the question of the retroactive for of Community Law and the application of doctrine 
‘Dodzi’]. Európai jog, 1 (2006) 3–11.  
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purchases in Hungary. Furthermore, the registration tax was not proportionate 
to the value, since it was not adjusted to the age of the vehicle, this, however, 
pertained merely to the period examined during the proceedings, since the 
respective rule was amended as of 1st January, 2006.  
 The other case regarding registration tax was the Németh Case (C-333/05), 
Ilona Németh v. Vám és Pénzügyőrség Dél-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága). 
As mentioned before, was lodged independently from the case above, but its 
subject-matter was similar, therefore the ECJ has jointed the two cases. The 
Német Case was initiated before the Bács-Kiskun Megyei Bíróság (County 
Court Bács-Kiskun). The court addressed four questions to the European Court 
of Justice. The first two questions focused on the issue, whether a tax imposed 
by a member state, such as the Hungarian registration tax may be considered 
to be a customs duty or a measure having an equivalent effect, or, if it cannot, 
can it be considered to be a type of import duty. If the former questions are 
answered in the negative, the third and fourth questions combined were directed 
at the issue, whether the domestic registration tax can be considered to be in 
conformity with Community rules. The Advocate General proceeding in the 
Nádasdy Case made a motion in this case, as well. According to his standpoint, 
the registration tax can by no means be considered a customs duty, since it was 
not imposed related to border-crossing, but by reason of the registration of 
motor vehicles in the territory of a specific member state. The logic of his final 
conclusion more or less coincided with his opinion explicated in the Nádasdy 
Case, scilicet, the registration tax was merely admissible in a member state, on 
condition that it was applied without differentiation, i.e., discrimination.  
 It was expectable on the basis of the former adjudicational practice of the 
European Court of Justice, that if it accepted the standpoint of the Advocate 
General, the Hungarian State would have to reimburse those entitled the 
amount of the registration tax collected pursuant to the regulation effective 
between May, 2004 and December, 2005. On the basis of the Judgement of the 
ECJ pronounced on 5th October, 2006, the registration tax was contrary to EC 
Law, so far as it imposed a higher amount of tax on used imported cars, than 
on used cars already registered in Hungary. In other words, the registration tax 
was contrary to Community Law, so far as its amount was calculated without 
taking the depreciation of the vehicles into account, in such a way that when 
applied to used vehicles imported from other member states, it exceeded the 
amount of the tax included in the residual value of similar used vehicles which 
have already been registered in the member state of importation.11  
  
 11 For the cases concerning Hungarian registration tax, see: Simon, D.: Taxation de 
l'immatriculation des véhicules automobiles. Europe, 2006 Décembre Comm. nº 367. 
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e) Controversy on compatibility of local business tax with EC Law 
 
Not only registration tax, but the Hungarian local business tax (HIPA) has 
given rise to much controversy. The first case referred to ECJ was the Lakép 
Case (C-261/05, Lakép Kft., Pár-Bau Kft., Rottelma Kft. v. Komárom-Eszter-
gom Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal) which was taken related to judicial review 
of administrative decision to impose local business tax by tax authority. In its 
petition for preliminary ruling, the referring court requested the construction of 
specific rules of the so-called Sixth Tax Law Directive (Council Directive 
no. 77/388/EEC). It expected an answer to the question, according to which 
conditions a kind of tax qualifies as sales tax, or, whether only one kind of 
sales tax was admissible. The essential question in this case was also the third 
one, since the main proceedings dealt with tax obligations deriving from legal 
relations established before our accession to the EU. Consequently, it was 
questionable, whether a retrospective calculation of taxes on the basis of tax 
obligations established in the period before the accession was admissible, if in 
the period before the accession a member state had applied two or more kinds 
of sales tax. With reference to its ruling on the above-mentioned Ynos Case, 
the European Court of Justice declared the lack of its competence on 9th 
February, 2006, since it had competence to construe Council Directives in new 
member states exclusively as of the date of accession. Whereas, the taxes 
contested in the main proceedings had been imposed in the period before the 
EU membership of Hungary.12 
 In the second case relating to local business tax was the Kögáz Case (C-
283/06, Kögáz Rt. és tsai v. Zala Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal), which was 
later joined with OTP Garancia Case (C-312/06, OTP Garancia Biztosító Rt. 
v. Vas Megyei Közigazgatási Hivatal). Contrast with the Lakép Case analysed 
                                                      
20–21, Domahidi Á.: Ungarische Zulassungssteuer für Pkw gemeinschaftswidrig. 
Europäische. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2007. 127–128, Adobati, E.: Diritto 
comunitario e degli scambi internazionali. 2006. 758–759, Anon.: Az Európai Közösségek 
Bírósága 2006. október 5-én, a C-290/05. és a C-333/05. számú egyesített Nádasdi Ákos 
kontra Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága ügyekben hozott 
ítélete [Judgement of ECJ in the joined cases C-290/05 and C-333/05 Ákos Nádasdi versus 
Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága on 5 October 2006]. 
Európai jog, 6 (2006) 38–45, Vincze A.: Széljegyzetek a regisztráció adóhoz közösségi jogi 
nézőpontból [Marginal notes to the registration tax from a Community Law’s perspective]. 
Európai Jog, 4/5 (2004) 3–9. 
 12 See: Anon: Az Európai Közösségek Bírósága 2006. február 9-én, a C-261/05. számú 
Lakép Kft. ügyben hozott végzése [Judgement of ECJ in the case C-261/05 Lakép Kft. on 9 
February 2006]. Európai jog, 6/2 (2006) 44–46.  
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above, a feature of the /Kögáz Case was that it did not concern an obligation 
obtaining before the accession, but taxes imposed following 1st May, 2004. 
After suspending its proceedings, the Zala Megyei Bíróság (County Court) had 
recourse to the European Court of Justice. The first question exposed the issue, 
whether the provision of our Accession Treaty, according to which Hungary 
may maintain local business tax allowances to an extent of at most 2 per cent of 
the tax base until 31st December, 2007 can be interpreted as a provisional 
exemption from the maintenance of the local business tax or the possibility of 
the maintenance of the local business tax allowances implies the further 
applicability of the local business tax. In case of a negative answer to the first 
question or more exactly, to the two partial questions, the County Court seeks 
answer to the question, whether according to the correct interpretation of the 
Sixth Tax Law Directive, according to which criteria can a kind of tax “qualify 
as not a kind of turnover tax”.  
 The case joined to Kögáz Case has arrived from the Hungarian Supreme 
Court. In the OTP Garancia, the Supreme Court formulated its first question in 
a similar manner, but logically more precisely, than the Court referring in the 
Kögáz Case. Accordingly, the first question concerned the issue, whether the 
pertaining provision of our Accession Treaty concerning allowances in the 
local business tax can be interpreted as a provisional exemption from the 
maintenance of the local business tax or does that simultaneously imply that 
the possibility of the maintenance of local business tax allowances justifies 
the further maintenance of local business tax. In fact, the second question 
challenges the compliance of the disputed form of tax with Community Law, 
however, here again, the Supreme Court formulated its question more precisely: 
do we need to interpret the Sixth Tax Law Directive “in such a manner that it 
prohibits the maintenance of local business tax directed at the taxation of 
activities pursued with the aim of the acquisition of profit and income in the 
capacity of an undertaker, the main feature of which is that it is imposed on net 
income, so that it is reduced by the acquisition price of articles sold, by the 
value of certain intermediary services and by the cost of materials, that is, does 
such a tax with respect to this article qualify as sales tax.”  
 Consequently, the question was whether the HIPA can be evaluated as type 
of VAT according to the Sixth Directive. If yes, the HIPA could be in-
compatible with the EC Law, because the Member States should maintain only 
one type of VAT in their taxation system. For this reason, the ECJ attempted to 
make comparison the character of HIPA to which of VAT. The ECJ regarting 
to this declared that the VAT is levied on individual transactions at the 
marketing stage and its amount is proportional to the price of the goods or 
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services supplied,13 a tax such as the HIPA is, by contrast, based on the 
difference, calculated under accounting legislation, between the turnover linked 
to the goods sold or the services supplied during a fiscal period, on the one 
hand, and the purchase price of the goods sold, the value of the intermediary 
services and the costs of the materials, on the other. Since a tax such as the 
HIPA is therefore calculated on the basis of periodic turnover, it is not possible 
to determine the precise amount of that charge which may be being passed on 
to the client when each sale is effected or each service supplied, such that the 
condition that this amount should be proportional to the price charged by the 
taxable person is not satisfied. Moreover, the legislation on the HIPA includes, 
with regard to a number of situations, simplified rules, broadly based on a 
standard rate, for establishing the basis of assessment by reference either to 
the basis of another tax plus a fixed percentage (for sole traders and small 
agricultural producers), or to a fixed percentage of another tax (for undertakings 
subject to simplified business tax). The conclusion of the ECJ was that a tax 
such as the HIPA is not intended to be passed on to the final consumer in a way 
which is characteristic of VAT. It means that would not suffice to classify a tax 
such as the HIPA as a turnover tax within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, 
inasmuch as it is not levied on transactions in a manner comparable to VAT.  
 This standpoint declared by ECJ was not a surprise. Although in a very 
similar case concerning the Italian regional tax (irap),14 it was considered 
incompatible with Community Law by the Advocate General, but the Court 
was later more permissive and did not accept the opinion of the Advocate 
General. Consequently, the characteristics of turnover taxes is strictly inter-
preted in the adjudicational praxis of ECJ.  
 It can be mentioned two other case concerning the HIPA regulation which 
were not joined with Kögáz and OTP Garancia cases. In the OTP Bank Case 
(C-195/07, OTP Bank Rt. and Merlin Gerin Zala Kft. v. Zala Megyei Köz-
igazgatási Hivatal), the Zala Megyei Bíróság (County Court Zala) requested 
preliminary ruling proceedings. Since the subject of the petition is related to 
the local business tax, the two questions posed by the Court fully coincide with 
the formerly formulated ones related to the Kögáz Case. Due to the judgement 
of the Kögáz Case, the referring court has revoked its reference and the case 
has been cancelled. 
  
 13 See by analogy: Case C 475/03 Banca Popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I 9373, 
paragraph 30.  
 14 The above referred Case C 475/03 Banca Popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I 9373. 
I can be mentioned that Hungary has been concerned by this Italian Case as well, because 
the Government submitted observations.  
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 The other case in this field was the Vodafone Case (C-447/06, Vodafone 
Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt., Innomed Medical Orvostechnikai Rt. v. 
Hungarian State, Budapest Főváros Képviselő-testülete, Esztergom Város 
Önkormányzat Képviselő-testülete). The referring court was Fővárosi Bíróság 
(Municipal Court). In the questions referred, the Court asked whether the norms 
of Act of Accession, which allowed to Hungary to apply, up to and including 
31 December 2007, local business tax reductions of up to 2% of the net receipts 
of undertakings, granted by local government for a limited period of time on 
the basis of Hungarian tax law, must be interpreted as meaning that it concerns 
a temporary derogation which allows Hungary to maintain the complete 
business tax until that time. The last question was significantly interesting. The 
referring court in this case asked the interpretation of ECJ on the practice of 
Hungary's first and second-level tax authorities, which has consisted in 
avoiding any examination of the compatibility with Community law of the 
local business tax (HIPA), by suggesting to taxpayers that they amend their 
tax returns by means of self-revision, thus making difficult or impossible the 
practical application of Community law and requiring taxpayers to initiate tax 
proceedings with uncertain consequences. Namely, the question referred to the 
compatibility of this administrative practice with Article 10 TEC implying the 
doctrine of so called ‘loyal/sincere cooperation with the Community’.15  
 Unfortunately, the ECJ had not opportunity to pass judgement in this case. 
After having registered the case, the ECJ ordered to discontinue the procedure, 
because the referring Court informed ECJ about the appeal of the Parties in the 
main proceeding against the reference to preliminary ruling. Therefore, the 
referring court has revoked its reference and the case has been cancelled.  
 
f) Pending cases 
 
Two references from Hungarian courts are actually in process. In the Cartesio 
Case (C-210/06, the case of Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt. related to the 
registration of change) the Szegedi Ítélőtábla (Court of Appeal Szeged) instituted 
proceedings related to the Decision of the Cégbíróság (Court of Company 
Registration), which had rejected the transfer of the seat of a limited partnership 
based in Baja to Italy. The petition for preliminary ruling propounded general 
  
 15 Art 10 TEC: “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achieve-
ment of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.” 
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and specific questions. The general questions inquired into the issue, whether 
the Court of Appeal was entitled to refer a case of appeal against the decision 
of the Court of Company Registration to preliminary ruling to the European 
Court of Justice. On the other hand, can the Court of Appeal of Second Instance 
be considered a forum that proceeds in the last instance in re Community Law, 
scilicet, a court that is obligated to refer a case to the ECJ for preliminary 
ruling, if a question of interpretation arises. Finally, an interesting problem of 
procedural law was also exposed: can the entitlement of a court to request 
preliminary ruling be limited by the fact that an appeal against the decision 
suspending the proceedings and initiating preliminary ruling is admissible and 
the forum adjudging such an appeal may supervise this decision, that is, may 
instruct the court to continue the proceedings. The meritorious questions 
concerned the specific problems of the main proceedings, scilicet, whether on 
the basis of EC Law (the right of establishment) a company of a member state is 
permitted to transfer its seat into another member state and maintain its 
original nationality. The European Court of Justice registered the case and no 
further proceedings have been conducted till this time.  
 Concerning the meritorious question of the case, it is notable that according 
to the facts of the case of the main proceedings, the transfer of headquarters 
had not been deemed to be substantiated on grounds of the freedom to settle 
down in former cases in the adjudicational practice of the European Court of 
Justice. The transfer of seat and the maintenance of legal entity are deemed to 
be admissible exclusively in the framework of Community associations, such as 
European Company (SE, Societas Europaea) and European Economic Interest 
Grouping (EEIG). 
 The case mentioned at last in this section is connected with the EU’s third 
pillar legislation. A reference for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Bíróság 
(Municipal Court) has been lodged on 7 August 2007 relating to a criminal 
proceedings (Katz Case, C-404/07). The question submitted by the Hungarian 
Court concerns the compatibility the Hungarian criminal procedure law to the 
Council Framework Decision 2001/220 of 15 March 2001 on the standing of 
victims. The dilemma is given by a controversial norm of the Hungarian criminal 
procedure code which defines the main rules on the so called ‘supplementary 
private prosecution’ (a person who can sustain a charges instead of a public 
prosecutor in certain cases, e.g. if the public prosecutor withdraw it etc.). But 
according to an other general norm, it is forbidden a witness who was heard 
in a case, to act as a prosecutor in the same case. It means, if a victim was 
interrogated as a witness (that is often the case), this person would not act 
supplementary private prosecution in the same procedure. Despite this 
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Hungarian norms, the Council Framework Decision obliges the Member States 
to take measure on protect the rights of the victims.  
 
 
III. Direct Petitions of Hungarian Individual Persons 
 
a) Individuals before the ECJ 
 
Another significant scope of proceedings conducted by the judicial forum in 
Luxembourg is constituted by proceedings instituted as a consequence of 
direct petitions. Individual persons may have recourse to the European Court 
of Justice with five specific types of petitions: with a view to the annulment of 
specific Community actions in case of direct concern, in case of institutional 
default, with a view to the compensation of damages incurred by the institutions 
of the Community and their employees during the accomplishment of their tasks, 
in case of legal disputes related to agreements concluded by the Community, so 
far as the European Court of Justice has been designated as an arbitration court, 
and in case of legal disputes concerning civil service between the Community 
and its employees.  
 Adjudication of the first four types of petitions is subject to the competence 
of the European Court of First Instance (cases registered as type “T”), whereas, 
in case of a petition of type 5, the Civil Service Tribunal is entitled to proceed 
(cases registered as type “F”). Upon the submission of direct petitions, repre-
sentation by a lawyer is obligatory, appeals vis-à-vis the decisions of the Court 
are admissible. The following direct petitions have been submitted to the Court 
from Hungarian individual persons, scilicet, natural and legal entities. 
 
b) Cases obviously inadmissible 
 
In his action in the Szolnoki Case (T-193/05, A. Szolnoki v. Hungary), the 
plaintiff imputed various kinds of breaches of law to Hungary, the defendant, 
and requested the European Court to obligate the defendant to terminate its 
unlawful conduct. Before the Court could have reached a decision on the case, 
which would have by all means been a rejecting judgement with reference to 
the lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff withdrew his petition and the case was 
cancelled from the register. The other case, in which the European forum had 
obviously no power to pass judgement, was Varga Case (T-203/05, Zsuzsanna 
Varga v. Hungary/Greece). On the basis of the action of the plaintiff, the 
Hungarian Court had obligated the father of the son of the plaintiff living in 
Greece to pay alimony. Since the implementation of this decision was thwarted 
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in Greece, the plaintiff took action at the Hungarian Court against the Republic 
of Greece by reason of alleged defaults during the implementation of the 
decision above by Greek authorities. Since the latter was also ineffective, she 
took direct action at the European Court and requested the establishment both 
of the fact that both Hungary and Greece violated several provisions of inter-
national and Community law pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in civil and commercial cases and of the obligation of those to pay a 
specific amount of money (practically a compensation equivalent to the amount 
of the alimony). Under its Judgement of 18th October, 2005, the European Court 
terminated its proceedings with reference to the obvious lack of its competence 
and to the fact that the European Court may exclusively decide on the compen-
sation of damages incurred by Community institutions and their employees 
during the implementation of their duties. And finally, the third case followed 
by same consequences was the Tóth Case (T-153/07, Tóth v. Hungary). The 
case has been registered by the Court of First Instance. The complaint referred to 
several presumptive unlawfulness at a Hungarian university which caused injure 
to former student, Ms. Tóth. The proceeding is not closed yet, but its outgoing is 
absolutely not doubtful: the founding treaties and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court do not guarantee individual persons the option of the submission of direct 
petitions vis-à-vis member states. In such cases, petitions are normally rejected 
by the Court of First Instance by reason of an obvious lack of competence. 
Supposedly, the Court of First Instance will order to reject this complaint.  
 
c) Annulment procedures  
 
The Budapesti Erőmű Case (T-80/06, Budapesti Erőmű v. Commission) is 
linked to proceedings concerning state subsidies. The plaintiff requests that the 
Court of First Instance annulled the decision of the European Commission to 
open a formal investigation procedure in the case of state subsidising of the 
costs of readjustment in Hungary, alternatively annul that decision, so far as it 
applies to the electric energy purchase agreements concluded by the plaintiff. 
The Commission decided on launching official proceedings concerning the 
contested decision on the assumed new state aid provided in the form of electric 
energy purchase agreements concluded between Hungarian electricity generators 
and the public Hungarian transmission operator. In its reasoning, the plaintiff 
refers primarily to a lack of competence, since according to its standpoint, it 
can be inferred from specific provisions of the Accession Treaty that the 
Commission has jurisdiction exclusively over state subsidies granted after the 
accession of the new member state. However, the electric energy purchase 
agreements had been concluded prior to accession and they are not applicable 
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after the accession. For the purpose of the justification of its action, the plaintiff 
refers to a manifest error of law and erronious discretion. According to its view-
point, it cannot be objectively justified that the electric energy purchase 
agreements of the plaintiff do contain State Aid. According to the plaintiff, the 
Commission failed to assess the nature of these agreements, made an inadequate 
assessment of the notion of economic advantage, of the notion of distortion of 
the competition and impact on trade. The case has not been adjudged by the 
Court of First Instance before the completion of the present review. 
 The other example to this category is the E.ON Case (T-57/07, E.ON Ruhrgas 
International AG and E.ON Földgáz Trade Zrt. v. Commission). In their pleas, 
the plaintiffs requested the partial annulment of specific documents of the 
European Commission proceeding as a competition authority. In a competition 
authority procedure, the Commission declared that the acquisition of two 
Hungarian gas companies by the applicant E.ON Ruhrgas International AG 
was compatible with the common market and the functioning of the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area on condition that the parties concerned complied 
with certain conditions and obligations. As one of the obligations, the plaintiff, 
E.ON Ruhrgas International AG undertook to organise and implement a gas 
release programme on the Hungarian market. Furthermore, the initial auction 
price was to be set at a definite rate of the weighted average cost of gas, so that 
the applicants did not suffer aggregate losses. In the contested letters, the 
Commission indicated that the losses made by the applicants in a given 
auction should be offset by any profits made by the plaintiffs in other 
auctions. Nevertheless, the applicants contest this and are of the opinion that 
losses which result from gas release auctions do not need to be offset by 
potential profits that may derive from future auctions. In support of their 
arguments, the applicants maintain that the Commission has no legal basis for 
increasing the financial burdens and thereby, subsequently, change the legal 
obligations deriving from a former related decision. Furthermore, the applicants 
contend that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission have been infringed, 
namely, neither have all the members of the Commission deliberated on the 
content of the two contested letters, nor has there been a proper delegation 
of powers to the Directorate General of the Commission. The Court of First 
Instance has not reached a judgement until the completion of the present 
review.  
 
d) Civil servants before the ECJ 
 
Quantifying the cases in context with Hungary in point of numbers, its 
considerable part concerns legal dispute civil servants belonging to the 
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institutions of the EU. In the following section will be mentioned examples to 
this type of procedure. 
 The plaintiff in the Lesetár Case (T-453/04, Péter Lesetár v. European 
Commission) intended to undertake employment in an institution of the Commu-
nity, therefore, he took written and oral entrance examinations. According to his 
standpoint, the evaluation of his written exam notably underevaluated his 
performance, furthermore, the oral exam was not adequately conducted. For that 
reason, he requested in his petition that the Court of First Instance changed the 
decision of the admissions committee, he was taken in employment and that 
the Court ordered the payment of his average salary for the lagging time. The 
Court cancelled the case from the register without conducting the proceedings. 
In the Tóth Case (F-107/05, Gergely Tóth v. European Commission), the 
plaintiff's complaint pertained to his placement on the payroll and his civil 
service grade as an employee. He challenged his placement with reference to 
his standpoint, according to which on the one hand, the substantiating Staff 
Regulations cannot be applied to temporary employees, on the other hand, that 
it violated equal treatment. He also referred to discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship and to the infringement of the free movement of employees, since 
the citizens of new member states are by all means appointed according to more 
unfavourable provisions. He requested his replacement and a compensation for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The Civil Service Tribunal suspended 
the proceedings under its Ruling of 6th April, 2006, until a decision in a similar 
case is passed. The plaintiff in the Borbély Case (F-126/05, Andrea Borbély v. 
European Commission) had been formerly employed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Hungary. She was appointed for probation as an official of the 
European Commission. According to her petition, she had requested her 
employer to grant her benefits and the reimbursement of travel expenses due 
on various titles according to the Staff Regulations, however, the Commission 
rejected this. The Civil Service Tribunal, which had jurisdiction in the 
proceedings, partially justified the claims of the plaintiff under its Judgement 
of 16th January, 2007. It considered her claim for installation allowance and 
daily subsistence allowance substantiated, therefore, it instructed the employer 
of the plaintiff, i. e., the European Commission to retrospectively compensate 
the plaintiff for these benefits supplemented by the amount of the interests. 
 Mr. Simon attempted to claim in two separate proceedings law. In the 
Simon I. Case (F-58/06, Balázs Dániel Simon v. Court and Commission), the 
plaintiff was employed by the European Court as an official being a lawyer-
linguist, then he submitted an application to the European Commission for a 
post. The Commission selected the plaintiff for the position, who requested the 
Court to transfer him to the European Commission, however, the Court rejected 
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the repeated requests of the plaintiff, who subsequently lodged an appeal to the 
Civil Service Tribunal to annul the latter decisions with reference to the 
deficiencies of the reasoning, obvious errors of discretion and abuse of compe-
tence. He also referred to the infringement of the principles of the protection of 
legitimate expectations and of non-discrimination as legal bases of the annulment. 
Finally, the plaintiff revoked his action, and subsequently, the Tribunal terminated 
the proceedings under its Judgement of 15th March, 2007. In the second claim 
(Simon II. Case (F-100/06, Balázs Dániel Simon v. Court and Commission), the 
plaintiff requested that specific decisions of the authority entitled to the 
appointment were annulled, so far as they deprived the plaintiff of his rights 
deriving from his appointment to a probationary official (his seniority and grade), 
as well as of his rights deriving from the confirmation in his position. His 
reasoning was based on the principle of the prohibition of declining the rights 
secured under the Staff Regulations, the prohibition of the infringement of 
obtained rights and the prohibition of the abuse of authority. He explained in 
his petition that he did not intend to abandon the staff of officials, but wished 
to change his workplace and sphere of activity, thereby, he would not have lost 
his obtained rights. The plaintiff later revoked his action, consequently, the 
Tribunal terminated the proceedings under its Judgement of 15th March, 2007 
and prescribed the cancellation of the case from the register. 
 Lastly, one should refer to the Dálnoky Case (F-120/06, Noémi Dálnoky v. 
Commission). Although, in this case the plaintiff is of Romanian nationality, in 
her claim, she expressly refers to her Hungarian ethnic origin and mother 
tongue, furthermore, the subject-matter of the case is also related to that aspect, 
therefore, it is expedient to consider the case to have Hungarian implications. 
In her plea in law, the plaintiff requested that the Civil Service Tribunal 
annulled the notice of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) for an 
open competition aimed at the employment of inter alia counsellors of Romanian 
citizenship. On the other hand, she requested that the defendant be ordered not 
to advertise or conduct a competition in the future, according to which the 
Candidate was expected to have a thorough knowledge of a specific language 
of the Community, but it should require the thorough knowledge of any 
language of the Community, disregarding the case, when the knowledge of a 
specific language is required with regard to the specific nature of the position 
to be filled. In case the competition requested to be cancelled would be conducted 
before the decision of the Civil Service Tribunal is passed, she requested that 
EPSO was obligated to eliminate all disadvantages suffered by the plaintiff or 
other persons concerned by reason of the discriminatory provision of the notice of 
the competition (e.g., announcement of a new opportunity for those, who had 
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been discouraged from the submission of an application by the discriminative 
provision mentioned above.) 
 According to the plaintiff, who is of Hungarian ethnic origin and has a 
Hungarian mother tongue, the contested announcement violated Community 
Law, since it required that candidates had a thorough knowledge of Romanian. 
In other words, the announcement violated the right of the plaintiff to equal 
treatment and the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality, since 
Romanian citizens with Romanian mother tongue were unreasonably advantaged. 
Furthermore, according to the reasoning of the plaintiff, the announcement 
enforced discrimination on grounds of nationality prohibited under Staff 
Regulations and Article 12 EC, so far as a number of notices for competitions 
published in the past had permitted the nationals of certain member states to 
prove the thorough knowledge of an official language of the Community, other 
than the main language of the member state of which they were nationals. 
Furthermore, she also mentioned that the announcement of the competition 
included a requirement precluded under the Staff Regulations, that is, the Staff 
Regulations permits the prescription of the thorough knowledge of a specific 
language (cf. any language) of the Community as a requirement, if that is 
specially necessitated by the position or if that is justified by another impartial 
and lawful objective. Besides, in a special plea, the plaintiff requested as an 
interim measure that the Civil Service Tribunal suspended the contested 
application procedure, until a decision on her plea in the main proceedings was 
reached. 
 The Civil Service Tribunal has rejected the plaintiff's plea for interim 
measures under its Judgement of 14th December, 2006. Then, on 27 September 
2007 has ordered that the action of the plaintiff is manifestly inadmissible. As 
the most important argument, the Tribunal has referred to the too late submit 
of the plaintiff’s claim. The Tribunal pointed out that according to the Staff 
Regulations, a notice of competition is an act drawn up by the appointing 
authority. Thus, the challenging of a notice of competition must be preceded 
by a complaint lodged, in accordance with the Staff Regulations, an action 
before the Tribunal must be brought within three months of the date of 
notification of the decision taken in response to the complaint. This time limit 
is to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days. How-
ever in the present case, the Tribunal has found that, the main action was 
brought after the expiry of the time-limit for doing so.  
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IV. The Republic of Hungary in a position of a defendant or a plaintiff 
 
a) The procedures concerned 
 
At the European Court of First Instance, any member state including the 
Republic of Hungary may take action as plaintiff related to complaints against 
the Commission, furthermore, in issues of state subvention and of commercial 
protective measures vis-à-vis the Council and in proceedings launched following 
petitions submitted against measures taken by the Council as an executive power. 
Before the European Court, member states can come up both as defendants 
and plaintiffs. In proceedings instituted for the purpose of the establishment 
of a breach of obligation by a member state, the Commission shall proceed 
as plaintiff vis-à-vis the Member State, disregarding the exceptional case, 
when in lieu of the Commission, another member state initiates proceedings 
by reason of a breach of obligation. As a matter of course, in such a case, the 
latter member state will proceed as plaintiff. Furthermore, member states may 
take action as plaintiffs before the European Court, if they submit a petition 
with a view to the annulment of an institutional action or to the establishment 
of an institutional default, or, in case of appeals against the Judgements of 
Court of First Instance.  
 
b) Criteria of the quality for maize: the first victory of Hungary 
 
In its first direct action, namely in the Case T-310/06 (Republic of Hungary 
v. Commission), the Republic of Hungary requested the partial annulment of 
specific rules pertaining to maize intervention affecting domestic producers 
expressly detrimentally. According to the reasoning of Hungary, the Commission 
breached the legitimate expectations of the producers by introducing during the 
financial year a requirement relating to the specific weight of maize. Further-
more, the Commission failed to take account of the principles of legal certainty 
and proportionality and the requirement of gradual adjustment, which are 
incompatible with the inordinately short preparatory period between the date 
of publication and the date of entry into force. As a conditional viewpoint, the 
plea of Hungary mentioned that the Commission did not have the authority to 
lay down the requirement relating to the specific weight of maize. In case the lack 
of authority cannot be justified, the plea refers to an abuse of power, scilicet, 
the Commission exceeded its powers, when it substantially altered the inter-
vention regime for maize in practice, under the pretext of amending the 
qualitative parameters for intervention. Notwithstanding, even if the Commission 
was empowered to lay down the requirement relating to the specific weight of 
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maize, according to the Hungarian standpoint, the Commission made a manifest 
error of assessment by establishing a criterion for the average quality of maize, 
since it did not take account of the fact that the maize produced in the 
Community is mainly used for fodder. We have already referred to the fact that 
the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 253 EC to state 
the reasons on which legal acts are based and has also infringed the procedural 
rules of the Management Committee for Cereals in not respecting the time 
limit laid down by those rules.  
 Hungary, the applicant requested the expedition of procedures as a pro-
visional measure, which was rejected under the Judgement of the Court of 16th 
February, 2007. The Court acknowledged the argument of the applicant that 
the date on which the contested provisions entered into force took producers 
by surprise, for they had reasonably expected to have time in which to adjust to 
the introduction of such a novel obligation. On this too late date, the producers 
had no opportunity to modify their structure of production. Because of the 
short period of the introduction, the Hungarian producers, even if prudent and 
circumspect, could not, for want of prior information, reasonably have expected 
that the variety of maize sown and the technology used would no longer enable 
them to produce maize meeting the quality conditions for buying in inter-
vention. Although farmers produce for the free market, the conditions for 
intervention buying nevertheless influence their financial decisions. Moreover, 
the Court pointed out that the Regulation of the Commission does not state 
clearly and expressly that the introduction of the criterion of specific weight 
for maize is intended, in addition to the need to ensure consistency with the 
rules applicable to other cereals, to upgrade the quality criteria for maize. 
Consequently, the explanations furnished by the Commission during the 
proceedings, to the effect that specific weight forms a relevant criterion of 
quality, do not reflect the fundamental reason for the introduction of that criterion 
as it appears from a close reading of the Regulation. Besides, according to the 
Court’s decision, the Commission was not able to dispel the established contra-
diction, with the result that not only is its claim that specific weight reflects the 
nutritional value of maize not supported by any evidence but it constitutes, 
moreover, a manifest error of assessment in light of the only evidence available 
to the Court in these proceedings. After that all, the Court declared that the 
Regulation is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and the claimed 
provisions of the Regulation relating to the criterion of specific weight for 
maize must be annulled.  
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c) Infringement procedures against Hungary 
 
The first case opened by the Commission was Case C-30/07 (European Com-
mission v. Republic of Hungary). The proceedings were related to defaults of 
legal harmonisation and notification. According to the plea of the Commission, 
the defendant, i. e., the Republic of Hungary did not comply with its obliga-
tions deriving from Council Directive no. 2003/109/EC concerning the status 
of third country nationals who are long-term residents in Hungary, since it failed 
to adopt respective and compliant law, decrees and administrative provisions 
and to inform the Commission thereof. The period prescribed for the implemen-
tation of the directive in national law expired on 23rd January, 2006. After the 
Hungarian Országgyűlés (Parliament) have passed the required modifications 
of law at the close of the year 2006, the Commission revoked the claim and the 
ECJ ordered to cancel this case from the register.  
 The other infringement procedure, the Case C-148/07 (European Commission 
v. Republic of Hungary) was initiated by the Commission before ECJ also because 
of reason of the breach of obligations deriving from legal harmonisation. Namely, 
the Commission requested the establishment of the fact that the Hungarian 
law-maker, by failing to eliminate the restrictions to the provision of cable 
television services imposed by Para. (4) of Article 115 of Act 1 of 1996 on Radio 
and Television, failed to fulfil its obligations under Commission Directive no. 
2002/77/EC on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services. According to the Commission, pursuant to the above-
mentioned law, the Republic of Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under the 
above-mentioned directive by restricting the right of cable television service 
providers to broadcast programmes, so that in territorial coverage it is no more 
than one third of the population. The obligation of transposing the directive 
should have been fulfilled by the date of our accession to the EU, scilicet, the 
period prescribed for transposing the directive into national law expired on 30th 
April, 2004. The default of the Hungarian legislative organs was also in this 
case quiet evident. Országgyűlés has modified the act complained, then, the 
claim was revoked and the procedure terminated.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing it will be seen that the embedment of the Hungarian 
adjudicational system in the Courts of the European Union is possibly more 
noteworthy than that was expected before the accession. The participation is 
especially outstanding in the preliminary ruling procedures. In the first three 
110 BALÁZS HORVÁTHY 
  
years period of our membership, the number of cases referred by Hungarian 
courts counts almost so much as which of preliminary ruling procedure referred 
by the other 9 Members States acceded with us in 2004 (Hungary’s had 11 
references, the other nine Member States had altogether 14 between 2004–
2007). Consequently, it can be declared, that Hungarian courts refer most actively 
to ECJ for interpretation of EU Law within preliminary ruling procedure among 
the countries of the region, even if the major part of the cases described in 
this essay were in connection with the local business tax (5 cases) and with 
registration tax imposing on cars (2 cases). Generally, these preliminary ruling 
procedures referred by Hungarian courts were well and profoundly prepared, 
only one case may be regarded as an example for unconsidered reference: in 
Vajnai Case concerning the use of totalitarian symbols, the ECJ has not 
examined the substance of the case but refused the request for obvious lack of 
competence.  
 The cases relating to procedures initiated by individuals are not of importance 
until now but one consequence can be formulated. As the cases Varga and 
Szolnoki have shown the attorneys representing the individuals have significant 
responsibility for avoid to lodge unnecessary requests before ECJ. In these 
cases previously mentioned, the plaintiffs claimed for such cause of action 
which is unquestionably outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ (action for damages 
against Member States etc.). These cases cause not only superfluous work 
and costs for ECJ but it gives an awkward evidence of attorney’s imperfect 
professional skills.  
 
